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the offence as one committed against all mankind, and hence as committed against another person. He who acts directly contrary to his own legal advantages is also often called a fool, though he hurts only himself. *Arouet*, the father of *VOLTAIRE*, told some one who congratulated him on his celebrated sons: "I have two fools for sons; the one is a fool in prose, the other a fool in verse." (One, having embraced Jansenism, was persecuted; and the other had to atone for his satires in the Bastile). As a general thing, the fool places the greater value in *things*, whereas the man of folly places a greater value on himself than he rationally ought to do.

When we call a man a *gawk* or a *fop*, we take as our basis the conception of their *want of sense*, or foolishness. The former is a young, the latter is an old fool. Both are misguided by knaves or rascals; and, though the former still claims pity, the latter draws upon himself only our bitter ridicule. A witty German philosopher and poet expounds the French words *fat* and *sot* (under the generic name of *fou*) as follows: "The former is a young German who goes to see Paris; the latter is the same young man when he returns from Paris."

That total weakness of the mind, which either suffices not even for the animal use of the vital forces (as in the case of *cretins*), or suffices at the utmost for the merely mechanical imitation of external acts, such as even animals can perform—as, for instance, to saw, to dig, etc.—is called *idiocy*, and cannot well be called a disease of the mind, since it is rather an utter deficiency of mind.

GOD AS THE ETERNALLY BEGOTTEN SON.

HEGEL'S "PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION," THIRD PART, "THE ABSOLUTE RELIGION," II, 3.
TRANSLATED FROM THE GERMAN BY F. LOUIS SOLDAN.

3. This requires that we should remember and define what the nature and definition of man is, how it is to be considered, how man ought to consider it, and what he ought to know of himself. Here we arrive at once at

(1.) The two opposite definitions: Man is good by nature; he

is not divided in himself, but his essence and concept is, that he is good by nature and that he is in harmony and peace with himself; on the other side [we find]: man is bad by nature.

The first definition is, therefore: Man is good by nature; his universal, substantial essence is good; opposed to this is the second. These are the contrasts for ourselves, for external contemplation, in the first place; the further consideration is that it is not only a view, a speculation which we form and create for ourselves, but that man naturally possesses self-knowledge, that he knows how he is constituted and what his determination is.

In the first place, the one proposition—man is good by nature—is the undirempted, undivided [phase]; on this standpoint he has no feeling of the need of atonement. If he needs no atonement this process and the whole matter considered here are superfluous.

To say that man is good by nature means, essentially, man is spirit in himself, rationality; he is created with and after the image of God; God is the Good, and man as spirit is the mirror reflecting God; he is the Good in himself [or potentially]. The possibility of his reconciliation can be based only on this very sentence; the difficulty and ambiguity, however, lie in the Potentiality.

The fact that man is good in himself [*i. e.*, potentially] does not express everything; for it is just the potentiality [*dies Ansich*] which is one-sidedness. Man is good in himself [potentially], *i. e.*, he is so only in an internal manner, according to his concept, and, therefore, not according to his reality. Since man is spirit, whatever he is truly he must be actually, for himself; physical nature remains in the Phase of potentiality [*beim Ansich*]; it is the potential concept, and in it the concept does not attain to actualized existence. The point, that man is good potentially only, this very Potentiality [*diess Ansich*] contains this deficiency.

The potentiality [*das Ansich*, in-itself] of nature means the laws of nature. Nature remains true to its laws; it does not step outside of them, and herein lies its substantial element by which it is surrounded with Necessity. The other side is that man should be in actuality also [*für sich*, for-himself] that which he is potentially [*an sich*, in-himself]; he must become this for-himself.

Whatever is good by nature is so immediately; it is the nature of spirit not to be something natural and immediate, but man as spirit has the characteristic that he steps out of naturalness and

passes over to the separation of his ideal and his immediate existence. This separation of an individual from its law, which is its substantial being, does not occur in physical nature, for the reason that the individual is not free. Man has for his essence that he places himself over against his nature and against his potentiality, and that he enters into this separation.

The other proposition arises immediately from what has been said: that man must not remain as he is immediately, but must transcend his immediateness; this is the idea of spirit. This overstepping of his naturalness, of his potentiality, constitutes the first ground for the diremption, and is that by which the diremption is immediately posited.

This diremption is the transgression, or the overstepping, of this naturalness and immediateness; but this must not be taken as if this overstepping were in itself the Evil, for this transgressing is contained already in naturalness itself. *Potentiality* and *Naturalness* are the immediate; but we are here speaking of spirit, and the latter in its immediateness oversteps its immediateness, and is thus the falling off from its immediateness or potentiality.

In this is contained the second proposition: man is bad by nature; his potential being, or his naturalness, is the Evil. In this his naturalness, his deficiency is contained at the outset; for, since he is spirit, he is different from naturalness; he is in a state of diremption. One-sidedness is immediately contained in this naturalness. If man is according to nature only, he is bad.

Natural man is he who is good in himself, according to the idea; in a concrete sense, however, that man is natural who follows his passions and impulses, who is hedged in by his desire, and to whom his natural immediateness is law.

He is natural, but in this state of naturalness he is also a willing being, and he is bad; his impulse and inclination form the sole content of his will. Considering the form—that is to say, considering that he is a will-ing being—he is no longer an animal; but the content, the aims of his volition, are as yet the [merely] natural. So far this standpoint; this higher standpoint is, that, if man is bad by nature, he is bad because he is a natural being.

That state, which is represented as the first state and one of in-of innocence, is the state of naturalness, or that of the animal. **Man's** guilt must be imputable to him; in so far as he is good, he

should be so, not in the manner in which a natural thing is good, but it should be his merit, his will; it should be imputable to him. Guilt [and merit] imply imputability [*i. e.*, responsibility].

A good man is so with and by his will; it is his own merit [*Schuld*]. Guiltlessness or innocence [*Unschuld*] means, to be without will, to have nothing in one's composition that is bad, and, therefore, it means also to have nothing that is good. Natural things, for instance animals, are all good, but such goodness cannot be attributed to man; in whatever respect he is good he is necessarily so with his will.

The absolute demand is that man should not remain a [merely] natural being; his should not be a [merely] natural will. It is true that man has consciousness, but he nevertheless, even as man, remains a merely natural being, when Nature constitutes the [whole] aim and end, content, and characteristic of his will.

More stress must be laid on the following characteristic: Man is man as subject; and, as a natural subject, he is a special, single subject; his will is a special, single will, and his volition is filled with the content of this special singularity. In other words, natural man is selfish.

From a man who is called good we demand that he be at least guided by general considerations, and act according to laws. Naturalness of will is properly selfishness of will; it is different from universality of will, and opposed to the rationality of that will which has been raised to universality. This bad element, or Evil personified in a general way, is the devil. The latter, as the negativity which wills itself, is in this respect identity with itself, and must, therefore, also have some kind of affirmation. Such is the case in Milton's work, where the devil in his characteristic energy is better than some of the angels.

But by the circumstance that man is bad, inasmuch as he is natural will, the other side, that he is good in himself, is not annulled; according to this idea, he always remains good. But man is consciousness; this implies that he is distinct, that he is a reality, a special man [*ein Dieser*], a subject; he is distinct from his idea, and, since this subject exists immediately only as distinct from its idea, having not yet returned to the unity of its subjectivity with its idea, its reality is, therefore, the natural reality, and this is selfishness.

The being bad presupposes at once the relation of reality to the idea; there is nothing posited in it but the contradiction of potentiality, of the idea, of singularity, of Good and Evil. It is a mistake to ask, "Is man good by nature, or not?" It is a wrong position; it is just as superficial to say that he is good as well as bad.

As regards, in particular, the point that will is arbitrariness, since it may will the good or the bad, such arbitrariness is certainly not will. Will exists only when it has determined itself; as long as either one thing or another is willed, it is not yet properly will. Natural will is the will of desire, of that inclination which wills the immediate, that does not yet will any special thing ["*diess*"], for the latter would require rational will—will which is cognizant of the fact that Law is Rationality. It is enjoined upon man not to exist as natural will, not to be what he is by nature. The idea of will is another matter; as long as man exists therein [in natural will], or remains in it, it is only potential will, and not yet real will, nor as yet will as spirit. This is the universal; the particular must be eliminated. What belongs to the defined sphere of morality can only be considered as concerning a special condition; it does not relate to the nature of spirit.

On the other hand, when we say that the will is bad, it is evident that we speak of will when we consider man concretely; and this concrete and real object cannot be merely negative. The bad will, however, is posited as mere negative volition, and this is an abstraction only; for when man, according to his nature, is not what he ought to be, he is nevertheless rational in himself, since he is spirit. This is the affirmative element in him, and the circumstance that he is not by nature as he ought to be concerns the form of the will simply: the essential is that man is potentially spirit. That which is potential abides when natural will is relinquished—it is the idea, the abiding and self-producing element. When we say, however, that will is bad by nature, it is only negative will which has this quality; and in this, therefore, we have the concrete before us, of which this abstraction is a contradiction. This has so wide an application, that when, for instance, the existence of the devil is asserted, it is necessary to show what affirmative element there is in him—strength of character, energy, consistency. In the concrete, the affirmative predicates are at once

emphasized. We forget in all this, when we speak of men, that they are men educated by customs, manners, laws, etc. We are told, "Men are not so bad, after all; just look about you." But then they are already, ethically and morally, educated men, who are in the phase of reconstruction and conciliation. The principal thing is to know that we must not think of such states as that of the child when we speak of religion; the fact is rather that in the representation of truth there is essentially placed before us the successively unfolded history of that which man is. The contemplation here is a speculative one; the abstract differences of the idea are here presented as occurring successively, in time. If educated man is to be considered, we must find in him the change, the reconstruction, the discipline, through which he has passed; he must exhibit the transition from natural to true will, and his immediate, natural will must appear as annulled in this.

(2.) If the first attribute is that man immediately is not what he ought to be, we must remember that man should also recognize himself as immediately imperfect; thus, his being bad or evil becomes the subject of contemplation. This might easily be interpreted to mean that man is assumed to be bad in and by contemplation only, so that this contemplation is looked upon as a kind of external injunction or condition; and that if he were not to contemplate himself thus, the other attribute—that of his being bad—would also disappear.

Since this contemplation is made a duty, it might be imagined that the contemplation is the essential point, and that without it no content existed. The nature of contemplation is also regarded as if it were contemplation or cognition which made man bad, or as if contemplation were bad, and that [therefore] there ought to be none, since it is the source of evil. This image-concept implies the connection of evil and cognition. This is an essential point.

The more particular manner in which this representation of this Evil is conceived is, that man becomes bad by knowledge, or, as the Bible represents it, that he eats of the tree of knowledge. In this way cognition, intelligence, the theoretical principle, and the will, enter upon a closer relationship to each other, and the nature of Evil is more closely considered. It should be remarked here that it is, indeed, cognition which is the source of all Evil, for cog-

nition or consciousness is the act which posits the separation, the negative, the primal division into subject and object, and the diremption of the several categories of potentiality. Man's nature is not what it ought to be, and it is cognition which discloses this to him, and which produces [the idea of] the Being which he ought not to be. [The ideal of] what he ought to be is the idea underlying man, and the knowledge that he is not this arises from the separation only; it arises from the comparison with that which he is in-and-for-himself. Through cognition only is the antithesis posited in which Evil has existence. The animal, the rock, the plant, are not bad; Evil exists within the circle of cognition only. It is the consciousness of Being-for-itself in contrast with another, but also in contrast with the object which is potentially universal, in the sense of the idea, of rational will. By this separation alone I am for myself, and in this the Evil is implied. To be bad, means abstractly to isolate one's self, the isolation or separation which has severed itself from the universal—which is the rational, the law, the categories of spirit. But with this separation arises [on the one hand] Being-for-itself and [on the other] the universal spiritual element, the law that ought to be.

This must not be understood as if a Contemplation or Cognition had any external relation to Evil, but Contemplation itself is the Evil. Man, since he is spirit, must proceed to this self-apposition; he must be for-himself, so that he has his antithesis before him as an object, [namely] that which is for him, the Good, the Universal, his Destiny. The Spirit is free, and freedom has the essential phase of this separation in itself. Being-for-itself is posited by such separation; in it the Evil has its abode; here is the fountain-head of the Evil, but it is also the point where atonement has its ultimate source. It is the cause of the disease and the fountain of health. We cannot show here more in particular how this comes about in the history of the Fall.

Sin is described in the account which tells that man ate from the Tree of Knowledge, etc. Thereby arise knowledge, diremption, separation, and with them the Good begins to exist for man—but, in consequence, Evil as well. It is represented as forbidden to eat thereof, and thus Evil or sin is represented, formally, as a transgression of a divine command, no matter what the content of the latter might have been. Here the command

has essentially this knowledge or cognition for its content. The rise of consciousness is posited by this, and, at the same time, it must be conceived as a standpoint on which one must not remain, which must be annulled; for it is not proper to remain in the diremption of Being-for-itself. The serpent says, furthermore, that by eating man will be like God, and thus appeals to the pride of man. God says to himself: Adam is become as one of us. The serpent, therefore, did not lie; God confirms what it said. Great labor has been devoted to the explanation of this passage, and some have gone so far as to assume that it was meant ironically. The higher explanation, however, is, that by this Adam the second Adam, or Christ, is meant. Knowledge or cognition is the principle of spirituality, which, as has been said, is also the principle which heals the wound of separation. In this principle of cognition there is also posited, indeed, the divine principle which, by further harmonization, must attain its conciliation and truth. In other words, it implies the promise and assurance of the recovery of the position of being an image [of God]. This prophecy is also found expressed metaphorically in what God says to the serpent, "I will put enmity," etc. Since by the serpent there is represented the principle of cognition as existing independently and externally to Adam, it is quite consistent that man (who is concrete cognition) should contain in himself the other side of the return movement and of reflection, and that this other side "shall bruise the head" of the former. [In the German Bible, as quoted by Hegel, "shall crush the head," etc.]

It is stated that first man did this; this is again the sensuous mode of expression. According to the logical meaning, "first man" signifies man as man, not any special, arbitrary one, not one out of many, but The First Man absolutely—man according to his idea. Man as such is consciousness, and with this he enters into this state of diremption—consciousness which, in its further determination, is cognition.

Since universal man is represented as "first" man, the question arises, Since it is only he that did this, how can it affect others? Here, then, we have the image-concept of Original Sin [*Erbsuende*, *lit.*, Inherited sin]; by it the deficiency is corrected that man as such is represented as a first man.

The diremption lies in the idea of man in general; the one-

sided conception by which it is represented as the deed of an individual is supplemented by the conception of Original Sin.

Labor is mentioned as the punishment of sin, etc.; this is, in general, a necessary consequence.

The animal does not work; it works only when forced, not naturally. It does not eat its bread in the sweat of its brow. It does not produce its food; it finds all its wants immediately supplied by Nature. The human being finds the material for all his wants [in Nature], but it may be said that the material is the least important element for man. The unceasing mediation of supplying his wants is carried on by work only.

Labor in the sweat of the brow, physical labor, and also mental work—which is harder even than the other—stand in immediate connection with the knowing of good and evil. That man must fashion himself to be what he is—that he eats his bread in the sweat of his brow—that he himself must produce what he is—all these belong to the essence, to the characteristics, of man, and they are necessarily connected with knowing good and evil.

It is said, furthermore, that the Tree of Life stood in the midst of it; this is the language of simple and childlike image-conception. There are two gifts for the wishes of man. The one is, to live in undisturbed happiness, in harmony with one's self and external nature; the animal remains in this unity, but man must transcend it. The other wish, perhaps, is, to live forever. According to these wishes the image-concept is made. If we look upon this more closely, it shows itself to be nothing but a childlike image-concept. Man as an individual living being, his individual life, his naturalness, must die; but when the narration is examined more closely, this appears to be the wonderful, the self-contradictory, element in it.

In this contradiction man is defined as Being-for-himself. Being-for-itself, as consciousness, self-consciousness, or infinite self-consciousness, is abstractly infinite; man's infinite self-consciousness is that he is conscious of his freedom, of his quite abstract freedom; this had not thus been brought to consciousness by former religions, in which the contrast never proceeded as far as this absoluteness, as far as this depth. By the fact that it is done here, the dignity of man is raised to a much higher standpoint. The subject has thereby received absolute importance, and

has become the essential object of God's interest, for it is self-consciousness, being-for-itself. It is pure self-certitude in one's self, and the point of infinite subjectivity exists in it. It is true that it is abstract, but it is abstract being in-and-for-itself. The form of expression for this is, that man, as spirit, is immortal, that he is the object of God's interest, that he is superior to finitude, dependence, and external conditions, and that he has the freedom of abstracting from everything, and it is implied therein that he is removed from mortality. In religion, because its contrast is infinite, the immortality of the soul is the principal phase.

That which may die is mortal, but whatever is capable of attaining a state in which there is no death is immortal. [When we speak of] combustible and incombustible, combustion is simply a possibility which approaches the object from without. The category of being, however, is no such possibility, but an affirmatively predicated quality which the object has already in itself.

Thus the immortality of the soul must not be conceived as something which will have reality only at some future time, but as a present quality. Spirit is eternal, and it is, therefore, present now. Spirit in its freedom is not within the circle of limitation. The thinking, purely cognizing spirit has the universal for its object, and this is eternity which is not merely duration—as the mountains endure—but it is cognition, or knowing. Here the eternity of spirit is brought to our consciousness by this cognition, by this separation itself, which has attained Being-for-itself, and is no longer entangled with the natural, contingent, and external. This eternity of spirit in itself is, that spirit, in the first place, is potential; the next standpoint is that spirit is not to remain as it is as natural spirit, but that it is to become what it is in-and-for-itself. The spirit must contemplate itself, and with this step the diremption arises. Spirit must not remain on this standpoint on which it is not as it is potentially; it must become adequate to its idea, and be universal spirit. From the standpoint of diremption the spirit looks upon its potentiality as Another, an Alien, and spirit itself is natural will; it is dirempted in itself. This diremption is in this respect the spirit's feeling or consciousness of the contradiction, and with this there is posited the need of an annulment of this contradiction.

On the one hand, it is said: **Man in Paradise without sin is**

immortal—terrestrial immortality and the immortality of the soul are not distinguished in this account—man will live forever. If this external death is to be merely a consequence of sin, man would be potentially immortal. On the other hand, the representation is also, that, if man ate of the Tree of Life, he would live forever.

The gist of the matter is this: Man is immortal by cognition, since only because he is a thinking being he is no longer a mortal animal soul, and thus only is he a free and pure soul. Cognition or thinking is the root of man's life and immortality, as a totality in itself. Animal soul is corporeity [materiality], but spirit is totality in itself.

The next step is, that this view, which we have formed in thought, should be made real in man—that is to say, that man should be made to arrive at the infinity of the contrast in himself; this contrast is that of Good and Evil, and that man should know himself, as a natural being, to be bad, and should become conscious of this contrast not only in a general way, but as existing within himself. He should know that it is he who is bad, in order that there may be aroused in him the injunction to be good, and with it the consciousness of the diremption and the grief about the contradiction and the contrast within him.

We have met with the form of Contrast in all religions; but the antithesis with the power of nature, the moral law, moral will, the ethical principle, fate—all these are subordinate contrasts, and contain a contrast to a particular only.

Man who transgresses a commandment is bad; but he is bad in this particular case only, in contrast with or in opposition to the particular commandment alone. Good and Evil appeared in general opposition to each other in the Persian religion; there the contrast is outside of the human being, and man is outside of it; it is not this abstract contrast within himself.

The injunction that man, having this contrast within himself, should conquer it, does, therefore, not mean that he disobeys some commandment or other, but that he is bad in-himself, that he is bad in general, strictly bad, bad in his innermost heart, and that this category of Evil is a category of his idea—and of this he must become conscious.

(3.) This depth is important. Depth means the abstraction of

the contrast, or its pure generalization, so that its two sides attain this very general determinateness toward each other.

This contrast has two forms: On the one side it is the contrast of Evil as such, [the feeling] that it is he himself that is bad; this is the contrast to God. On the other side there is the contrast with the world. He feels that he is at variance with the world; this is the origin of unhappiness or misery, which is the diremption on the other side.

In order that the need of universal atonement, and with it the divine atonement, or absolute atonement, may exist in man, it is necessary that the contrast attain this infinity, so that this universality comprehend the innermost soul, and that there be nothing not encompassed by this contrast, and the contrast is no longer a particular [but general or universal]. This is the profoundest depth.

a. We first consider the diremption in relation to one extreme: God. Man carries the consciousness within himself that he himself is, in his innermost heart, this contradiction; and this is the infinite sorrow for himself. Sorrow or pain exists only in contrast to [the idea of] what ought to be [the condition of man] in contrast to an affirmation. That which contains no longer anything affirmative, no longer contains any contradiction or pain. Pain is nothing but negativity in the affirmative, since the affirmative is thus in itself self-contradictory and torn.

This pain is only one phase of the Evil. Evil, merely for-itself, is an abstraction, and exists only in contrast to the Good. And since it is within the unity of the subject, the contrast to this diremption is the Infinite Pain. If there did not thus exist in the subject the consciousness of the Good, if there were not in his deepest soul the injunction to be good, there would be no pain, and badness and Evil would be empty nothing; they exist only in this contrast.

Evil and this pain can be infinite only because the Good, or God, is known as One God, as a pure spiritual God. It can be infinite only because the good is this pure unity, and when there is a belief in One God. Only in relation to the latter can and must the negative proceed to the category of the Bad or Evil, and the negation proceed to this universality.

One side of this diremption thus exists through man's elevation to the pure spiritual unity of God. This pain and this conscious-

ness is man's absorption in the depth within him [*die Vertiefung des Menschen in sich*], and with this his absorption in the negative phase of diremption, of Evil.

This is the negative internal absorption (*Vertiefung*) in Evil ; the internal absorption, affirmatively, is the absorption in the pure Unity of God. At this point we see that I, as natural man, am inadequate to that which is the True, and that I am hemmed in by many natural particularities ; but the truth of the One Good is just as unshakably firm within me, and thus this inadequacy exhibits itself as that which ought not to be.

The task and the injunction are infinite. One might say : Since I am a natural man, I have, on one side, consciousness of myself ; but naturalness consists in the absence of consciousness in regard to myself and the absence of will ; I am a being which acts according to its nature, and, as is often said, I am without sin or guilt, because I have no consciousness of what I am doing, and because I have no will in the proper sense ; I, therefore, am acting without inclination, and am taken by surprise by impulses.

But this guiltlessness disappears in this contrast. For it is this natural, unconscious, will-lacking Being of man which ought not to be, and which has, therefore, the predicate of Evil, in the light of the pure Unity, of the perfect Purity which I know to be the True and the Absolute. It is implied in what has been said, that, at this point, the Unconscious, the will-lacking state, must in itself essentially be considered the Evil.

But the contradiction still remains, no matter how we turn it ; since this so-called guiltlessness determines itself as the Evil or Bad, there remains inadequacy of myself compared with the absolute or with my essence, and in one direction or the other I know myself to be that which I ought not to be.

This is the relation to the one extreme, and the result or more definite mode of this pain is that it is my self-humiliation ; it is the contrition involved in the feeling that it is pain caused by myself, because I, as a natural being, am inadequate to that which I know myself [to be my ideal self], and which both knowledge and will tell me I ought to be.

b. As regards the relation to the other extreme, the separation there appears as unhappiness : man cannot find satisfaction in the world. His satisfaction, his natural needs, form neither a right

nor a claim. As a natural being, man is related to others, and others are related to him as powers; and, so considered, he is as contingent as the others.

But his demands in ethical respects, his higher ethical demands, are postulates and categories of freedom. Since these postulates, legitimate in themselves, and based on his idea (he has a knowledge of the Good, and the Good is in him), cannot find satisfaction in life, in the external world, he is unhappy.

It is unhappiness which drives and impels man back into himself; and since this fixed injunction of the rationality of the world dwells within him, he renounces the world and seeks happiness and contentment in himself through the harmony and accordance of his affirmative side with himself. In order to attain this, he renounces the external world, places his happiness in himself, and thus finds in himself satisfaction.

Of this command and of this unhappiness, we have mentioned these two forms: We saw that pain which proceeds from the universal, from above, in [the history of] the Jewish people, there the infinite postulate of absolute purity remains in the individual's naturalness, in his empirical knowing and willing. The other, the retrogressive movement out of misery within, is the standpoint where the Roman world suffered its downfall—this universal unhappiness of the world.

We have looked upon this formal inwardness [Subjectivity] which finds satisfaction in the world, upon rule and empire, upon God's purpose, which is represented, known, and understood as worldly dominion. Both sides have their one-sided features: the first may be said to be the feeling of humiliation; the other is the abstract elevation of man in himself; it is man who concentrates himself within. It is thus Stoicism and Scepticism.

The Stoic, Sceptic philosopher was thrown upon himself; he had to find satisfaction in himself alone, and in this self-contained independence and rigidity he was to attain happiness and harmony with himself; his abstract, ever-present, self-conscious inwardness was to be his basis.

In this separation, or diremption, we have said, the subject defines and conceives itself to be the extreme of abstract Being-for-itself and of abstract freedom; the soul sinks into its own depth, its whole abyss. This soul is the undeveloped Monad, the naked

Monad, the empty, content-lacking soul ; but since the soul is in itself the Idea and the Concrete, this emptiness and abstraction is contradictory to the soul's predicate of being concrete.

This, then, is the Universal, that in this separation, which is developed as an infinite contradiction, this abstraction is to be annulled. This abstract Ego is in itself also a Will ; it is concrete, but its immediate potential content is the natural Will. The soul finds naught in itself at first but appetites, selfishness, and the like and this is one of the forms of the antithesis that the Ego, the soul in its depth, is therein distinguished from the side of reality ; that the side of reality is not one which is constituted adequately to its idea and brought back to it, but that it finds, on the contrary, only natural Will in itself.

The antithesis to which the side of reality develops itself is that of the World ; in contrast to the unity of the idea, there is, thus, a universality of the natural will, whose principle is selfishness and egotism, and which appears in its realization as corruption, brutality, etc. The objectivity which this pure Ego possesses, and which belongs to it because it is adequate to it, is not its natural will, neither is it the world ; its adequate objectivity is the universal Being alone, which it [the Ego] does not possess as its [natural or original] content, and which has the whole content, the world, for its antithesis.

The consciousness of this contrast, of this separation of the Ego and the natural will, is that of an infinite contradiction. The Ego stands in an immediate relation to the natural will, or the world, and is at the same time repelled by it. This is the infinite pain, the world-sorrow. The conciliation which we have thus far found on this standpoint is only a partial one, and it is, therefore, insufficient. The congruity and consonance of the Ego within itself, which the Ego attains in the Stoic philosophy, where it knows itself as the thinking agent, and its object is the Thought-thing [*das Gedachte*] or universal—(and where the Ego looks upon all this strictly as the All, the Totality, as the true essence, and where, therefore, all this appears to it as a Thought-thing, as something of which the subject knows that it itself has posited it)—is a merely abstract atonement, for this Thought-thing is deprived of all determination ; it is only formal self-identity. From this absolute standpoint there cannot and there should not be such an ab-

abstract atonement; neither can the natural Will find satisfaction in itself, for it and the state of the world do not contain sufficient satisfaction for the man who has comprehended his infinity. The abstract depth of the antithesis necessitates the infinite sorrow and suffering of the soul, and with it an expiation which is just as perfect.

These are the highest and most abstract phases; the contrast is the highest. Both sides form the contrast in its greatest universality, in its deepest inwardness, in the universal itself; they are the contrasts in their greatest depth. Both phases, however, are one-sided: the first contains this pain, this abstract humiliation; and there the highest [element] is simply this inadequacy of the subject to the universal, and the separation and diremption which has not been abridged or annulled; it is the standpoint of the contrast of the Infinite on one side, and of a fixed Finitude on the other. This finitude is abstract finitude, and what belongs to me as mine in this, is thus the Evil only.

This abstraction finds its complement in the other, which is Thinking in itself, which is my self-adequacy, that I am satisfied within myself, that I can be satisfied within myself. But, by itself, this second phase is just as one-sided; it is only the affirmative, or self-affirmation within myself. The first phase—that of contrition—is negative only, without affirmation within itself; the second is to be this self-affirmation, this self-satisfaction within. But this satisfaction of myself within myself is only an abstract satisfaction by means of [an abnegation of or] flight from the world through inactivity and quiescence. Since this is a flight from reality, it is also a flight from *my* reality—not from external reality, but from the reality of my will.

The reality of my will, or the Ego as a special subject or will that is filled with a content, does not abide with me, but there remains for me the immediateness of my self-consciousness. It is true that this self-consciousness is a perfectly abstract one, but it contains the profoundest depth, and I am preserved in it.

This abstraction of my abstract reality does not exist within myself or in my immediate self-consciousness; it is not found in the immediateness of my self-consciousness.¹ On one side, there-

¹ The contrast which Hegel here speaks about is that of dependence and independence. In the former the soul feels its inadequacy to the injunctions of the higher

fore, the affirmation, free from that negation of the one-sidedness of immediateness, preponderates. There the negation is the one-sided element.

From these two phases the feeling of the need of a transition arises. The idea of the preceding religions has purged and cleared itself, until this antithesis was attained; and the fact that this antithesis has shown itself as an existing need has been thus expressed: "When the time was fulfilled," etc.—which means, that the spirit, the need of the spirit, exists which contains the reconciliation.

c. The atonement. The most profound need of the spirit lies in this: that the antithesis has been pushed in the subject to its most universal—that is to say, its most abstract—extremes. This is the diremption spoken of, the pain. Since these two sides are not separated, but exist as a contradiction in one [individual], the subject proves itself to be the infinite power of Unity; it can endure and outlive this contradiction. This is the formal, abstract, but, at the same time, infinite energy of the unity which the subject possesses.

That by which the need is supplied and satisfied is the consciousness of the expiation and of the cancellation and nugatoriness of the contradiction; it is the consciousness that this contrast is not the truth, but that its meaning is, that the Unity can be attained only by the negation of this antithesis. What is needed is peace and conciliation. The subject feels the need of

principle which it recognizes, and the subjective result is sorrow and suffering; the feeling of inadequacy is a negative feeling. The other pole of this antithesis is the standpoint which Hegel illustrates by an allusion to the Stoics. In it there is self-sufficiency and the feeling of independence. It is not real independence, but the ignoring of dependence. Man, as it were, considers the nutshell of his existence absolute space. It is the principle of abnegation which turns away from the activity of life, and, therefore, Hegel calls it a desertion of reality, an abnegation of real will. But the fact that this standpoint is an abnegation of reality, of a dependence which after all exists, is one of which the Stoic is not conscious himself. He does not tear himself away from dependence and combat it; he simply does not know of any; he is sufficient unto himself. Since this standpoint is, therefore, unconscious of any negative element, of any dependence, Hegel may well call it an affirmation, and say of it that the consciousness of the one-sided character of such seeming independence is lacking, and that "the abstraction of such abstract reality does not exist in man's immediate self-consciousness as long as he occupies this standpoint."—*Translator's Note.*

conciliation, and it has this need, because it [the subject] is infinitely One and self-identical.

The annulment of the antithesis has two sides.

The subject must attain the consciousness that this contrast has no existence in itself, and that the truth and the inner meaning is the cancellation of this contrast. And by this means, since the contrast is annulled in itself, according to its truth, the subject as such in its Being-for-itself may attain the annulment of this antithesis, and peace and conciliation.

(1.) The annulment of the antithesis in-itself constitutes the condition, the presupposition, the possibility of the power of the subject to annul it also for-itself. For this reason it is said that the subject does not attain conciliation by its own power, not of itself as a special subject, nor by its own individual deeds and doings. It is not by its acts and relation as that of a subject that the conciliation is brought about, or can be brought about.

This is the nature of the need, as regards the question how it may be satisfied. The conciliation can be brought about only when the need finds the separation annulled, and when the antithesis, whose extremes seem to flee each other, is null and void, and when the divine truth appears to this need as the annulled contrast in which both extremes have divested themselves of their mutual abstraction.

The former question arises, therefore, in this place once more : Cannot the subject bring about this conciliation of itself, through its own power, by making its heart worthy of the divine idea with piety and prayer, and by expressing this through its actions? And, if the single subject cannot do this, cannot at least all men who will the right receive into themselves the divine law, so that there would be a heaven on earth, and the spirit with its grace would be living and present, and would possess reality? The question is whether the subject, as subject, could not bring this about through itself. It is a common opinion that it could do this. We must remember and keep before our minds that we speak of the subject which rests on an extreme, which is for itself. Subjectivity has for its category that the positing [which is undertaken] is done by myself. This positing, doing, etc., is my own work, no matter what the content may be, and the Producing is, therefore, but a determination, one-sided in itself, and the product is

simply posited, and it remains for this reason in abstract freedom only. The question means, therefore, whether the subject cannot produce this by its [act of] positing. This positing must essentially be a presupposition, so that that which is posited is also in-itself. The unity of subjectivity and objectivity, this divine unity, must be as a presupposition for my Positing; then only can the latter have a content; the content is spirit, substance [*Gehalt*]—otherwise it would be subjective and formal—and thus only it receives a true, substantial content. With the determination of this presupposition, and according to the significance of such presupposition, it deprives itself of this presupposition and loses it. Kant and Fichte say that man can do good only in the presupposition of a moral world-principle; he cannot know whether it will grow and thrive; he acts simply with the presupposition that the Good possesses growth and success in itself and for itself, and is not merely something that is posited, but is objective according to its nature. The presupposition is an essential determination.

The harmony of this contradiction must, therefore, be represented as a presupposition for the subject. As soon as the idea cognizes the divine unity, it also cognizes that God is in-and-for-himself, and with this it attains the cognition that the activity of the subject is nothing by itself, and that it exists and endures only under that presupposition. To the subject the truth therefore must appear as a presupposition, and the question is, in what shape truth can appear on the standpoint on which we are; it is the infinite pain, this pure depth of the soul, and for this pain there shall be a cancellation of the contradiction. The latter is necessary, in the first place, as a presupposition, because it is this one-sided extreme.

The subject's activity and attitude is, therefore, that of positing activity on the one side only; the other is the substantial side, and the basis which contains the possibility. The latter is that this contrast in-itself does not exist. More explicitly expressed, it is, that this contrast eternally arises, and in the same way eternally annuls itself, and is likewise eternal conciliation.

We have seen that this is the truth, in the eternally divine idea; it is the nature of God as living Spirit to distinguish himself from himself, to posit Another and to remain in it identical with him-

self, and to possess in this Other the identity of himself with himself.

This is the truth, and this truth must constitute one side of what must obtain in the consciousness of man—namely, the substantial, potential side.

More explicitly this may be thus expressed : The contrast is simply Inadequacy. The contrast, the Evil, is the naturalness of human being and willing ; it is immediateness ; such is naturalness, and with immediateness there is posited also finitude, and this finitude and naturalness are inadequate to the universality of God, which is the strictly free, self-contained, infinite, eternal idea.

This inadequacy is the starting-point which constitutes the feeling of need. It is not a better definition to say that for our consciousness the inadequacy disappears on both sides. The inadequacy is ; it is implied in spirituality. Spirit is that which distinguishes and differentiates itself ; it is the positing of distinctions.

Since they are differentiated, they are, according to this phase, distinguished and not the same ; they are different from and inadequate to each other. This inadequacy cannot disappear ; if it did, the primal attribute of spirit [to be subject and object], its ever-active life, would vanish, and it would cease to be spirit.

HEGEL'S PHILOSOPHY OF THE STATE.

TRANSLATED FROM HEGEL'S "PHILOSOPHY OF SPIRIT," BY EDWIN D. MEAD.

[The numbers of the paragraphs of the original are inserted for convenience of reference.—EDITOR.]

535. The State is the *self-conscious* ethical Substance—the union of the principle of the Family and of Civil Society. This same unity exists in the Family as the feeling of love, and is its essence ; and this receives, at the same time, the *form of self-conscious* Universality through the second principle named, viz., the principle of knowledge and self-active Will. This has for its content intelligent subjectivity, inasmuch as its characteristics unfold into cognition ; and this is its absolute purpose, so that it will come to exist as rational for itself.